Foreword by Kozyris, P. John
SYMPOSIUM ON INTEREST ANALYSIS
IN CONFLICT OF LAWS:
AN INQUIRY INTO FUNDAMENTALS WITH A
SIDE GLANCE AT PRODUCTS LIABILITY
Resolved: "Interest Analysis is a proper, adequate,
and workable method to choose the applicable law."
FOREWORD
P. JOHN KozYms*
The title of the present Symposium' conveys the message that a conflicts system
should be evaluated on a broad spectrum. Beyond meeting the minimum constitu-
tional requirements, it should strive for justice, and do so in a manner that is as
workable as is feasible in this imperfect world of the law. The imperfection is even
greater in the intractable field of conflicts where ideal solutions are impossible and the
objective is to impair as little as possible.
Our focal point is interest analysis, the methodology which, in all its permuta-
tions, has dominated the conflicts agenda for the last quarter century and decon-
structed traditional conflicts in most states, including Ohio. The ground chosen to test
interest analysis against the other approaches is products liability, where the stakes are
high, the differences in the substantive law significant, and the conflicts issues
challenging.
While true believers of interest analysis remain legion, important questions have
been raised and persist on the validity of its premises (actuality of legislative intent,
reality and determinability of state interests in the private law sphere, distinction
between true and false conflicts), on the practicality and efficiency of its methodology
(cumbersdmeness, vagueness, manipulation), and on the wisdom of its normative
preferences (parochialism, domiciliary conceptualism). At the same time, the critics
are put to the test of comparative evaluation with viable alternatives since we are not
operating in a vacuum. Our cures should not aggravate the disease.
I remember vividly a 1979 comparative law meeting in which Professor Edgar
Bodenheimer boldly predicted that interest analysis would be dead in ten years. Hans
Baade, forecasting the opposite, predicted that interest analysis would be alive and
well in a grand alliance for progress. We are halfway to that deadline and sometimes
I wonder whether it is possible to test these predictions without first defining the
meaning of death; without deciding whether chrysalization or transfiguration or, more
ominously, transmogrification means death or rebirth. Indeed, interest analysis is
becoming as diverse as Marxism or Christianity. It has been subdivided into at least
three major groupings. At the right we find the Orthodox, whose prophet remains
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Brainerd Currie. The middle is occupied by Reformists, who modify the formula but
stick with the recipe. At the other end stand the Unitarians, who want to conduct
policy analysis their own way and whose left wing appears reconciled to neutral
conflicts rules, but differs from traditional conflicts principally in preferring personal
over territorial contacts.
Another problem is that interest analysis appears to be both a constitutional and
a conflicts doctrine. Some accept it in its original role of defining the maximum that
a state can do constitutionally, but question whether it constitutes "good" conflicts.
Namely, they draw a distinction between the permissible and the optimal. Others may
buy its soundness, but fret at the pretension that it is the only doctrine that is
responsive to the constitutional imperatives.
The conflicts revolution has been pregnant for too long. The conflicts misery
index, which is the ratio of problems to solutions, or of verbiage to result, is now
higher than ever. In the famous Prosser quip, conflicts was supposed to be a "dismal
swamp, filled with quaking quagmires.' '2 Now we are told that it has become a
"well-watered plateau.'' 3 Thus, there is no question that its stock is all wet!
We conflicts people should confess to some of our sins. We fire the "bullets of
our brain" 4 too much too often. While we are not alone in deluging a page when a
word would suffice, in citing the same authorities for the same propositions again and
again and again, in repeating the "jargon of the schools" 5 and our favorite incan-
tations in endless monotony, we surpass in redundancy most of our brethren with the
exception, perhaps, of those immersed in constitutional doctrine.
This Symposium could not have been expected to exorcise all the conflicts
demons. We tried, however, to concentrate on fundamentals and to talk to each other
rather than past each other. The main idea was to make a contribution to the much
needed sorting out process. 6
Our symposiasts include two each of the leading proponents and opponents of
interest analysis in the United States, respectively Professors Russell Weintraub and
Robert Sedler and Professors Lea Brilmeyer and Friedrich Juenger. A fifth distin-
guished jurist from abroad, Professor Dimitris Evrigenis, presents an international
perspective. A contribution by Professor Symeon Symeonides seeking to place
interest analysis in a long term perspective is followed by a series of brief comments
by other conflicts experts, by my Postscript as the symposiarch, and by an appendix
containing the results of an investigation into the preferred conflicts solutions for
products liability.
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